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EUGENE R. FIDELL*
I am honored to be with you today to present, under the auspices of
the Hastings io66 Foundation, the 2oo9 Anderson Lecture. My topic is
Transparency, 2009.
Transparency has become something of a buzzword in current
discourse in many contexts. It is typically associated with governmental
action of one kind or another, although it certainly applies as well to
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
commercial entities. Quite what the word means remains a subject of
dispute, although it is tempting to say of it what Justice Stewart said of
hard-core pornography, "I know it when I see it."' I do not think it
means knowing who got what bonuses from A.I.G., but I do think it
means knowing who did what, when, in the related legislative process.
In my remarks today I would like to survey some current
developments in the field and to suggest that this will prove to be one of
the key themes of democratic society for our generation and those that
will follow.
* Senior Research Scholar in Law and Florence Rogatz Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School;
President of the National Institute of Military Justice; Of Counsel at Feldesman Tucker Leifer Fidell
LLP, Washington, D.C. Professor Fidell was the featured Lecturer for the annual Marvin Anderson
Lecture Series, which is sponsored by the Hastings io66 Foundation.
i. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). For where the phrase
came from, see Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ Law Blog, The Origins of Justice Stewart's "I Know
It When I See It," http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/o9/27/the-origins-of-justice-stewarts-i-know-it-when-i-
see-it (Sept. 27, 2007, 17:oo EST).
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I
John D. Podesta cochaired the Obama-Biden Transition Project. On
December 5, 2008, he issued a brief memorandum announcing a "Seat at
the Table" Transparency Policy? Under it, all policy documents and
written policy recommendations from official meetings with outside
organizations were to be posted on the Transition website, along with the
dates of and organizations represented at official meetings conducted in
either the Transition headquarters or agency offices, along with any
documents presented at those meetings? The only exceptions were for
"non-public" or classified information acquired from the agency review
process and internal memoranda.4 Covered meetings were defined as
those with three or more participants from "outside" (meaning
nongovernmental) organizations.
I will not dwell on the fact that the Transition Project redacted the
name of the staffer to whom transparency-related documents were
required to be e-mailed for uploading to the website.6 Nor did the
definitions close the door to unofficial, but equally permissible, meetings
involving fewer individuals. Nobody's perfect, and the 2oo8 Transition
deserves credit for having regularized a process that was, in the past,
both more chaotic and more opaque. The Transition is already receding
in public memory as the new administration grapples with the incessant,
urgent, and competing demands of actually governing. Nonetheless, it is
worth pausing long enough to acknowledge that Mr. Podesta's
memorandum was important. It foreshadowed by a few weeks one of the
first steps taken by the new President.
On January 21, 2009, one day after he took office, President Obama
issued two related memoranda to heads of Executive Departments and
federal agencies.7 The first ordered that the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)8 "be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt,
openness prevails."' The second, on "Transparency and Open
Government," announced that the federal government should be
transparent, participatory, and collaborative. 0 "Transparency," the
President explained,
2. Memorandum from John Podesta to All Obama Transition Project Staff (Dec. 5, 20o8),
available at http://change.gov/page/-/open%2ogovernmentlyourseatatthetable/SeatAtTheTable memo.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Memorandum on Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 26, 2oo9);
Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government. 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 55 (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. Ilo-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
9. Memorandum on Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4683.
i0. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government. 74 Fed. Reg. at 4685.
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promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about
what their Government is doing. Information maintained by the
Federal Government is a national asset. My Administration will take
appropriate action, consistent with law and policy, to disclose
information rapidly in forms that the public can readily find and use.
Executive departments and agencies should harness new technologies
to put information about their operations and decisions online and
readily available to the public. Executive departments and agencies
should also solicit public feedback to identify information of greatest
use to the public."
The President also ordered the preparation of an Open Government
Directive instructing agencies and departments "to take specific actions
implementing the principles set forth in [the transparency]
memorandum."I
With the attention of the nation and the world necessarily focused
on other, more pressing matters such as the economy, wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the fate of those detained at Guantanamo Bay, it is not
surprising that the transparency memorandum received only the briefest
flurry of attention, and it will be months before we see the promised
Open Government Directive. 3 Nonetheless, I would like to suggest that
the memorandum itself is a logical outgrowth of the impulse that led to
Mr. Podesta's earlier memorandum, and highly significant in itself. How
it is implemented may say more about our core ideas of government in
this still-new twenty-first century than will how we address the grave
immediate crises facing our country.
No one should anticipate that President Obama's transparency
memorandum will be a cure all. It may have an indirect effect on other
branches in the sense of setting an example or, as Professor Noah
Feldman put it, "chang[ing] the background tone of government." 4 In
addition, the Executive Branch is not without influence over
policymaking by Congress and the federal courts. Issues of transparency
abound in our legal system, and in important respects lie beyond the
direct reach of the White House. The question is the extent to which the
current interest in transparency will translate into change across the
entire spectrum of government activity.' To answer it requires a sense of
II. Id.
I2. Id.
13. The Open Government Directive was issued on December 8, 2009. See Memorandum from
Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Executive Dep'ts & Agencies (Dec.
8, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda 2oio/mio-o6.pdf.
14. Noah Feldman, In Defense of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009 (Magazine), at rII, 12.
15. The key roles under President Obama's transparency memorandum are played by the Chief
Technology Officer and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. See Memorandum on
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4685. One wonders whether the title of the
Chief Technology Officer should be changed to Chief Transparency Officer, as some have suggested.
See, e.g., Outragedmoderates.org, Obama Should Appoint a Government Transparency Officer, http://
www.outragedmoderates.org/2009/oI/obama-should-appoint-government.html (Mar. i6, 2oo9, 12:22
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the kinds of transparency skirmishes that have occurred in recent years
and are occurring right now.
2
I'll begin with one that hits close to home for me. In 2003, in my
capacity as head of the National Institute of Military Justice, a
nongovmental organization, I sent the Pentagon what I thought would be
an inconsequential FOIA request. I had read that Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld had consulted a variety of old Washington hands
concerning the military commissions President Bush had authorized in a
,6Military Order issued on November 13, 2001 . My request sought all
communications to or from persons other than officials of the
government concerning the military commissions and implementing
rules. I had drafted the letter precisely to step around the FOIA
exemption for inter- and intra-agency communications.'
We wound up having to sue. Only then did the Defense Department
conduct a serious search and the documents start to flow. But the
government resisted release of communications between the Pentagon
and the outsiders Mr. Rumsfeld had consulted."
Some of the documents released were quite interesting. For
example, we learned that members of the review board set up as an
appellate body for the military commissions participated in a briefing
regarding prosecution strategy-without the presence of any defense
counsel." This later became an issue in efforts to disqualify the review
board members, although enactment of the Military Commissions Act of
2oo620 mooted the matter by establishing a statutory Court of Military
Commission Review."
EST); posting of Mukesh Chatter to Money Aisle Blog, Barack Obama Needs a CTO-Chief
Transparency Officer, http://blog.moneyaisle.com/20o8/I I/barack-obama-needs-cto-chief.html (Nov.
18, 2008, 13:04 EST). Perhaps there should be a separate portfolio with that title, because, although
the field of transparency overlaps with technology, the two are far from identical.
16. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
17 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2oo6), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (207).
18. It also refused to release correspondence with the Attorney General of the United Kingdom,
Lord Goldsmith. This refusal was permissible under ro U.S.C. § 130c (2oo6 & Supp. 1 2007), once the
Secretary personally signed the requisite determination, which Mr. Rumsfeld eventually did. I assume
Lord Goldsmith's correspondence would have embarrassed our government.
19. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit ii-Vaughn Index (Second Index of Documents Withheld), at 48-50, Nat'l Inst. of
Military Justice v. Dep't of Def., 404 F. Supp. 2d 325 (D.D.C. 2oo5) (No. 04-312) (describing document
titled "MEETING NOTES: DEP SEC DEF and GENERAL COUNSEL ADVISORY MEETING
7/30/03"). The Defense Department released only the first page of this document, which listed the
individuals who were present.
20. To U.S.C. §§ 948-95ow (2oo6 & Supp. I 2007).
zx. Id. § 950f(a).
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At length, Judge Walton granted summary judgment for the
government, finding that Mr. Rumsfeld's friends fell within a judge-made
"deliberative process" exception to the FOIA." On appeal, a panel of the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,23 over a dissent by Judge Tatel.2in
his view, the government's position was contrary to the Supreme Court's
decision in Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective
Ass'n.i The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc,26 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.27
This decision means that any federal official can have secret
consultations with countless outsiders (or should I say "outside
insiders"') and affected parties, and the general public will never even
know unless the official elects to disclose that fact, as Mr. Rumsfeld did,
or disclosure is required by some other statute. It matters not that such
"consultants" have not qualified as "special government employees," a
status that affords a modicum of protection against conflicts of interest.
Seemingly all that is required to gain the benefit of this rule of
nondisclosure is that the consulted persons be asked by a government
official for their advice and have no personal stake in the outcome. Note
that such an individual could achieve the protected status by tipping off
the official that he or she was available to opine, in effect fishing for an
invitation. In this fashion, an "outside 'insider"' and an official could
easily collude to avoid public scrutiny.
Even though he concluded that the law forbade withholding
documents in the circumstances I've described, Judge Tatel thought it
wiser as a matter of policy to permit the kind of secret consultation in
which Mr. Rumsfeld had engaged." With great respect, allowing this kind
of off-the-record consultation detracts from public confidence in the
conduct of government business. It is also unfair to those whose interests
may be affected by the decisionmaker's actions.
In many instances, the kind of consultations in which Mr. Rumsfeld
engaged would become known soon enough. Thus, if the agency action
at issue is a rulemaking or adjudication subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 2 9 pertinent documents would
be made part of the administrative record and furnished to affected
22. Nat'l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 404 F. Supp. 2d 325, 347 (D.D.C. 2005).
23. Nat'l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 512 F-3d 677, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
24. Id. at 687-96 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 688 (citing Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. I, 9
(2001)).
26. Nat'l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep't of Def., No. o6-5242, 2oo8 WL 1990366, at *i (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 3o, 2008) (per curiam).
27. Nat'l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep't of Def., 129 S. Ct. 775, 776 (2008).
28. Nat'l1Inst. of Military Justice, 512 F.3d at 687-88 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
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parties.30 But in the case at hand, Mr. Rumsfeld's rulemaking lay outside
the APA's strictures,3' so the normal prohibition on ex parte
communications did not apply. Nor would it have been productive to
contend that the friends he consulted were a de facto federal advisory
committee and therefore subject to the transparency requirements of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.3' In the circumstances, therefore,
FOIA was the only vehicle for affording some measure of transparency. I
confess that I am disheartened by the prospect that officeholders may
now engage in Mr. Rumsfeld's ploy without fear of judicial disapproval.
Fast forward to 2009. Faced with President Obama's transparency
memorandum and undeterred by losing in every court to which the legal
issue was presented, the National Institute of Military Justice (NIMJ) has
asked the Defense Department to release the nineteen documents it was
permitted to withhold in the NIMJ FOIA litigation." Naturally, the
matter cannot be relitigated; release of the documents is now a question
addressed purely to the conscience and stated transparency policies of
the new administration. What will it do?
3
A second case study in Executive Branch transparency concerns
advice the government generates internally. We all watched over the last
several years as various Bush-era opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC) have emerged.34 Only recently, the Obama administration
30. E.g., Walter 0. Boswell Mem'l Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(i). See generally Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions and Administrative
Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 379 (2003).
32. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2oo6 & Supp. II 2oo8); see Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton,
997 F.2d 898, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
33. Letter from Will Kammer, Chief, Dep't of Def., to Michelle M. Lindo McCluer, Nat'l Inst. of
Military Justice (Mar. 26, 2009) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
34. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Dep't
of Justice (Jan. iS, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memostatusolcopinionsoil520o9.pdf
[hereinafter Jan. 15, 2009 Bradbury Memorandum]; Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Dep't of Justice (Oct. 6, 2oo8), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memoolcopiniondomesticusemilitaryforceioo62oo8.pdf, Memorandum from
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Attorney Gen. (June 8, 2002), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memomilitarydetentiono6o82oo2.pdf; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee,
Assistant Attorney Gen., to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Mar. 13, 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memorandumo3l32002.pdf; Memorandum from Patrick
Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney Gen. (Apr. 8, 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memojusticeauthorizationacto482002.pdf; Memorandum
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legislative Affairs (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/
memodetentionuscitizenso6272002.pdf; Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to John Bellinger, III, Senior Assoc. Counsel to the
President & Legal Advisor to the Nat'l Sec. Council (Nov. 15, 20ol), available at http://www.usdoj.govl
olc/docs/memoabmtreatyill15200ol.pdf; Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President &
462 [Vol. 61:457
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released another batch of OLC opinions concerning various aspects of
the so-called "war on terror,"35 including one, issued only five days
before the 2009 Inauguration, disavowing important aspects of earlier
Bush administration opinions.36
The point here is not whether the memoranda by Judge (as he now
is) Jay S. Bybee, Professor John C. Yoo, Patrick F. Philbin, and Robert J.
Delahunty7 were sound, but rather, whether they should have been
released earlier. Evidently none of the opinions released this month were
classified-they do not bear the usual markings. What is the standard for
deciding whether and when an unclassified OLC opinion will be
released? Given the pivotal role the Office plays in the conduct of
Executive Branch affairs and the fact that these opinions are binding
within the Executive Branch (if not on the President), is there any reason
not to make them public upon completion, assuming they are
unclassified?
But suppose an OLC memorandum is classified. As Louis Fisher has
written:
Secret legal memos are particularly damaging to the rule of law
when they build on untested theoretical definitions of presidential
power.... The rule of law is further weakened when memos remain
secret without the opportunity for colleagues to determine compliance
with legal and constitutional standards. Secrecy makes vetting within
the executive branch minimal.38
On this score, the cause of transparency has gained some ground. In
2004, in reaction to some of the Bush-era OLC memos that had become
public only through leaks, nineteen former OLC attorneys prepared a set
of best practices, two of which speak to the question of publication.3 9
According to one,
William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf; Memorandum from John C. Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to David S. Kris, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen. (Sept. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/docs/memoforeignsurveillanceacto9252ooi.pdf.
35. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Releases Nine Office of Legal Counsel
Memoranda and Opinions (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo9/March/o9-ag-
i8x.html; see Neil A. Lewis, Memos Reveal Scope of Power Bush Sought in Fighting Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at Ai; Charlie Savage & Neil A. Lewis, Release of Memos Fuels Push for Inquiry
into Bush's Terror-Fighting Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2oo9, at As8.
36. See Jan. 15, 2oo9 Bradbury Memorandum, supra note 34.
37. See supra note 34.
38. Louis Fisher, Why Classify Legal Memos?, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 2oo8, at 22, available at http://
www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=12o2422864198&slreturn=i&hbxlogin=i.
39. Walter B. Dellinger et al., Guidelines for the President's Legal Advisors, 8i IND. L.J. 1348,
1348, '354 (2006). The published version appeared with an introduction by Professor Dawn E.
Johnsen, President Obama's choice to head the Office of Legal Counsel. See Dawn B. Johnson,
Introduction to Dellinger et al., supra, at i345-
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On the very rare occasion when the executive branch-usually on the
advice of OLC- declines fully to follow a federal statutory requirement,
it typically should publicly disclose its justification.
.. . The need for transparency regarding interbranch
disagreements ... should be beyond dispute. At a bare minimum, OLC
advice should fully address applicable Supreme Court precedent, and,
absent the most compelling need for secrecy, any time the executive
branch disregards a federal statutory requirement on constitutional
grounds, it should publicly release a clear statement explaining its
deviation. Absent transparency and clarity, client agencies might
experience difficulty understanding and applying such legal advice, and
the public and Congress would be unable adequately to assess the
lawfulness of executive branch action.40
The proposed principles go on to address publication more broadly:
OLC should publicly disclose its written legal opinions in a timely
manner, absent strong reasons for delay or nondisclosure.
OLC should follow a presumption in favor of timely publication of
its written legal opinions. Such disclosure helps to ensure executive
branch adherence to the rule of law and guard against excessive claims
of executive authority. Transparency also promotes confidence in the
lawfulness of governmental action. Making executive branch law
available to the public also adds an important voice to the development
of constitutional meaning-in the courts as well as among academics,
other commentators, and the public more generally-and a particularly
valuable perspective on legal issues regarding which the executive
branch possesses relevant expertise. There nonetheless will exist some
legal advice that properly should remain confidential, most notably,
some advice regarding classified and some other national security
matters. OLC should consider the views regarding disclosure of the
client agency that requested the advice. Ordinarily, OLC should honor
a requestor's desire to keep confidential any OLC advice that the
proposed executive action would be unlawful, where the requestor
then does not take the action. For OLC routinely to release the details
of all contemplated action of dubious legality might deter executive
branch actors from seeking OLC advice at sufficiently early stages in
policy formation. In all events, OLC should in each administration
consider the circumstances in which advice should be kept confidential,
with a presumption in favor of publication, and publication policy and
practice should not vary substantially from administration to
administration. The values of transparency and accountability remain
constant, as do any existing legitimate rationales for secret executive
branch law. Finally, as discussed in principle 5, Presidents, and by
extension OLC, bear a special responsibility to disclose publicly and
explain any actions that conflict with federal statutory requirements.4'
40. Dellinger et al., supra note 39, at 1351. The discussion also noted that "federal law currently
requires the Attorney General to notify Congress if the Department of Justice determines either that
it will not enforce a provision of law on the grounds that it is unconstitutional or that it will not defend
a provision of law against constitutional challenge." Id.
41. Id. at 1351-52. In a similar vein, President Obama has undertaken to ensure that signing
statements "identify [his] constitutional concerns about a statutory provision with sufficient specificity
464 [Vol. 61:457
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The proposed principles correctly recognize that some advice may
well be classified. But classifying a document has the practical effect not
only of making it inaccessible by the public, but also of reducing its
transparency within the government itself, thus depriving decisionmakers
of the benefit of robust exchange of views. This seems to have been why
some of the OLC memoranda were not made available even to some
officials with a clear need to know.42 "Internal" or "intramural"
transparency deserves close study because other checks and balances,
such as judicial review or meaningful legislative oversight, may be
unavailable.43
4
The Executive Branch is not alone in having to deal with issues of
transparency." In this city particularly, which is well on its way to
becoming "ground zero" for state secrets litigation, I need hardly dwell
on the controversy that has emerged in the Al-Haramain litigation.45 My
prediction is that when the dust settles either at the Supreme Court or,
more likely, in Congress, an Executive Branch state-secrets claim will be
subject to some review by the courts. But that's a high-profile
controversy. Let me mention some others that may not yet have made it
onto your screens.
One interesting development has been the use of secret dockets by
the federal courts. These are cases in which, for one reason or another,
the very existence of the case is hidden from the public. The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press has done outstanding work in
calling attention to this disturbing practice, given the core principle that
to make clear the nature and basis of the constitutional objection." Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,669 (Mar. ii, 29oo); see also, e.g., Charlie
Savage, Obama Says He Can Ignore Some Parts of Spending Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 12, 2009, at AI8.
One can agree or disagree with the merits of any particular objection in a signing statement, or
whether a president may sign a measure and yet not enforce parts of it, see CHARLIE SAVAGE,
TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
241-49 (2007), but the mere act of disclosing objections is both proper and useful. Taken together,
signing statements provide a kind of MRI for an administration's reading of the Constitution.
42. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 181-82 (2007).
43. Such intragovernmental disclosures are distinct from disclosures to the public. For a
perceptive analysis of the ethical dimension of unauthorized disclosures to the public by government
attorneys, see Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1033 (2007).
44. Transparency issues also abound in the judiciary. Professor Arthur Hellman, for example, has
closely-and critically-studied the system for policing judicial ethics in the federal courts. See Arthur
D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors, 69
U. Prrr. L. REV. 189 (2oo7).
45. E.g., AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Obama, No. 09-15266, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS '3169, at
*2 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2009) (dismissing government appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denying motion
for stay).
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courts are open.46 Probably the best known of these cases was one from
Florida in which an error on the part of the Eleventh Circuit blew the
courts' covert In other instances, only when someone happened to
notice that docket numbers in the courts' public files had gaps, did the
light go on - sorry for the imagery- that there were cases about which no
one knew.48
In March 2007, the Judicial Conference responded by strongly
urging the federal courts "to ensure that, in response to queries about
sealed cases, the [computerized] message reads 'case under seal' rather
than 'case does not exist."' 49
The military justice system is another area in which docket access
issues have been raised. The system is not part of the administrative
apparatus of the federal courts, but it is still astounding that the Judge
Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the
senior uniformed lawyer in the Marine Corps, all resisted efforts to make
public the basic docketing information from which a journalist or
member of the public might be able to learn who was being tried for
what, when, and where. 0 In this digital era, there is no excuse for not
having this kind of information readily available, and I am happy to
report that my own old branch, the U.S. Coast Guard, under the
leadership of Rear Admiral William D. Baumgartner, has broken ranks
on this." I should also mention that the Canadian Forces are way ahead
46. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 58o (1980).
47. See generally Warren Richey, Supreme Court Decision May Limit Access to Terror Cases,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MoNITOR, Feb. 24, 2004, at 4 (noting discovery of case, through clerk's error, by Miami
Daily Business Review reporter); see also M. K. B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 804, 804 (2oo3) ("Motion for
leave to file petition for writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record
granted.").
48. See generally Kirsten B. Mitchell & Susan Burgess, Disappearing Dockets: When Public
Dockets Have Holes, the Public's Right to Open Judicial Proceedings Is Jeopardized, 30 NEWS MEDIA &
L., Winter 2oo6, at 4; Kirsten B. Mitchell, Partial Fix: D.C. Federal Court Acknowledges Existence of
Sealed Cases, but Finding Them Requires Search for Gaps in Docket, 3o NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring
2oo6, at 10.
49. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconfl07MarchProceedings.pdf,
noted in Tony Mauro, Judicial Conference Urges End to 'Secret' Dockets, NAT'L L.J. Mar. 19, 2007, at
3.
5o. Letter from Maj. Gen. Scott C. Black, Judge Advocate Gen. of the Army, et al., to Kathleen
A. Duignan, Executive Dir., Nat'l Inst. of Military Justice (Nov. 6, 2oo6) (on file with the Hastings
Law Journal), noted in Nathan Winegard, Open to Those in the Know, 31 NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer
2007, at 2I; REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, MILITARY DOCKETS: EXAMINING THE PUBLIC'S
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE WORKINGS OF MILITARY JUSTICE 9 (Lucy A. Dalglish et al. eds., 2oo8), available
at http://www.rcfp.org/militarydockets/whitepaper.pdf.).
5 . Rory Eastburg, News Media Update, Coast Guard Pledges to Post Court-Martial Dockets
Online (Dec. 4, 2008), http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=7243&fmt. The Air Force now also
publishes its courts-martial docket. See Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., Dep't of the Air Force
Judge Advocate Gen.'s Corps. Air Force Publishes Courts-Martial Docket, JAG NEWSWIRE, Sept. 2,
2009, http://www.afjag.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123166031.
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of us on this subject, having posted their court-martial docket on the web
long before us.52
The military services now seem to be moving in the right direction,53
but their initial resistance was inexplicable. Equally inexplicable is the
fact that access to decisions of at least one of the military's intermediate
courts-the service Courts of Criminal Appeals-remains a hit-and-miss
proposition, as a military justice blog has repeatedly demonstrated. 4
Cases seem to appear on the web at random times, and some seem never
to do so.5" Moreover, some of the most valuable sites are available only
to active, reserve, or retired military lawyers, thus penalizing those
accuseds who exercise their right to be represented by civilian attorneys
at their own expense.
A report submitted in 2oo8 by Philip Alston, the UN's Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, referred
to the "troublingly opaque character of the US military justice system." 6
In it, Professor Alston points out both the serious consequences of the
lack of transparency in military justice and the ease with which this can
be remedied." Referring to a 2007 incident in Afghanistan in which, after
one Marine was wounded in a suicide attack, some nineteen persons
52. See CMJ- Court Martial Calendar, http://www.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/ccm-cmc/index-eng.asp
(last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
53. Office of the Judge Advocate Gen., supra note 51.
54. CAAFIog, http://www.caaflog.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) ("CAAF" stands for "U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces"), was pivotal in the endgame of Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.
Ct. 2641 (2oo8), where, in counting jurisdictions on the death penalty for child rape, the Court and
counsel overlooked a pertinent provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See Linda
Greenhouse, Justice Department Admits Error in Failure to Brief Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2oo8, at
Ai5; Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a Factual Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 20o8, at
Ai. The Court wound up adhering to its decision. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. I (2oo8)
(denying rehearing); Adam Liptak, Justices' Ban on Executing Child Rapists Will Stand, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2oo8, at A2. As the CAAF blog notes, military decisions appear in the Westlaw "All Federal
Cases" database and its Lexis counterpart ("Federal Cases, Combined"), contrary to the suggestion in
Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 223, 224 (2008). See
Posting of Dwight Sullivan to CAAFlog, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Publishes Article
with Obvious Mistake About Electronic Access to Military Justice Appellate Opinion, http://
caaflog.blogspot.com/2oo9/o3/harvard-journal-of-law-technology.html (Mar. 8, 2009, 20:41 EST).
Whatever caused the Kennedy snafu, it was not a gap in electronic databases.
55. The military does not have a monopoly over tardy release of decisions. For example, the
August 22, 2oo8 decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review in In re Directives
[Name Redacted by the Court] Pursuant to Section ro5B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
No. o8-or, 2oo8 U.S. App. LEXIS 27439 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2oo8), was not released until January
15, 2oo9. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Court Affirms Wiretapping Without Warrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2009, at A13. Even allowing for the need to redact classified information in what wound up as
a relatively brief opinion, this delay seems excessive.
56. See Philip Alston, UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions, Press Statement (June 30, 2008), in Press Release, UN, UN Special
Rapporteur Calls on the U.S. to Take Steps to Avoid Unlawful Killings (June 30, 2008), available at http://
www.unhchr.chlhuricane/huricane.nsf/viewor/734o9531EE29EEF8C12574780o53EFC2?opendocument.
57 Id.
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were killed and many others wounded as the Marines withdrew, he
wrote:
Unfortunately, this particular incident is only one of many in which
the military justice system has failed to provide the appearance-and,
perhaps, the reality-of justice. The system is opaque, making it
remarkably difficult for the US public, victims, or even commanders to
obtain up-to-date information on the status of cases, the schedule of
upcoming hearings, or even judgments and pleadings which are
theoretically public. This lack of transparency is, in part, a side-effect
of the decentralized character of the system, in which commanders
around the world are given the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and act as "convening authorities" to initiate courts-
martial.
If there is the will to do so, this problem can be solved quickly and
easily. Reporting requirements and a central office, or registry, could
be added to the existing system at little cost, and this would markedly
improve accountability and reduce the sense among Afghan and Iraqi
civilians, and others around the world, that US forces operate with
impunity."
It is my hope that reports such as this, as well as prodding by the
National Institute of Military Justice and the Reporters Committee,59 will
lead military authorities to give higher priority to transparency. Doing so
can only improve public confidence, here and abroad, in the
administration of justice.
A fascinating recent judicial development concerns the PACER
system. PACER stands for "Public Access to Court Electronic Records."
Lawyers and journalists who cover the federal courts know it well. It
permits users to read and download-at a cost of eight cents a page-
documents filed with the federal courts." Recently, the federal courts
arranged a pilot pro ect making PACER documents available for free at
seventeen libraries. ' An activist named Carl Malamud undertook to
download everything possible and make it available for free.62In
response, the pilot program was shut down.63 How this particular
controversy unfolds at this point remains cloudy, but it suggests that
there are untapped realms of information waiting to be mined, inevitably
including information that ought not to be available under the 2007 rule
changes adopted in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002.64
58. Id.
59. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 50.
6o. PACER Frequently Asked Questions, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.htm#GP8 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2009).
61. John Schwartz, An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and Easy, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2009, at A16.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(c)(3), i i6 Stat. 2899, 2914 (2002); e~g., FED. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 49.1(a); see Schwartz. supra note 6i.
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Mr. Malamud precipitated an enormous amount of work by court
clerks and lawyers by demanding that incorrect filings be removed from
the public PACER dockets and replaced by substitutes with the
necessary redactions.6' Apparently referring to Mr. Malamud's interest in
joining the Obama administration, John Podesta observed that "[h]e
would certainly shake thinfgs up."66 Mr. Podesta laughed when he said
that to the Times' reporter. Query whether the court clerks and lawyers
for whom Mr. Malamud caused so much work would join in the mirth.
5
Turning now to the Congress, there is good news and bad news. Of
course, things like the "secret hold" or earmarks whose authorship is
close to impossible to determine remain part of the scene, 68 but both
seem at least to be falling into disfavor. Secret sessions of the Senate
and House of Representatives are permitted under the Constitution,70
but these have become extremely rare. The most recent secret session of
the Senate occurred on November I, 2005, while the House met in secret
only a year ago, on March 13, 2oo8.71
One interesting area of congressional practice concerns
international agreements that are not subject to Senate ratification. In a
forthcoming paper, Professor Hathaway considers the startling number
and scope of these agreements, some of which are either never reported
to Congress or, if they are, are reported too late for Congress to do
anything about them. In part, she proposes an "administrative track"
akin to the notice-and-comment model for making legislative rules" with
65. See Schwartz, supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. E.g., Posting of Kate Phillips to The Caucus, Secret Hold Placed on Senate Disclosures, http://
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2oo7/o4/i8/secret-hold-placed-on-senate-disclosures/ (Apr. 18, 2007, 18:38
EST).
69. See 2 U.S.C. § 30b (2oo6) (establishing protocol for identification of a Senator who wishes to
object to a proceeding); H.R. Res. 6, iioth Cong. (2007) (changing House Rule XXI to require the
name of the member submitting an earmark request); see also WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., SENATE POLICY ON "HOLDS": ACTION IN THE IIOTH CONGRESS (2oo8); SANDY STREETER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURAL RULES CONCERNING EARMARK DISCLOSURE (2009);
Carl Hulse, Senate May End Its Tradition of Blocking Bills in Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007, at A13;
David D. Kirkpatrick, House Tightens Disclosure Rules for Pet Projects, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2007, at
Ai, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/0ioo6/washington/o6cong.html.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
71. MILDRED AMER, SECRET SESSIONS OF CONGRESS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEw 6 tbls. I & 2
(2oo8). Another area in which legislative transparency is at issue concerns the timeliness of Senate
campaign financing disclosures. See John Fritze, 'Transparency' Fixes Seen in Congress' Future, USA
TODAY, Jan1. z, 2009, at 5A.
72. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 19
Yale L.J. 140 (2009).
73. Id. at 242-44.
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which we all are familiar from Administrative Law, but tailored to the
context of executive agreements negotiated under the President's sole
authority and ex ante congressional executive agreements.74 She also
suggests that congressional notification of international agreements
under the Case-Zablocki Act" should be made public upon submission,
and the agreements themselves, if unclassified, be made public before
they go into effect-a step that, in her words, "would allow public input
into the process of international lawmaking.", 6 Professor Hathaway has
kindly permitted me to mention her very exciting proposal, but because I
am anxious not to steal her thunder or worse yet, misstate it, I will not go
into it in greater detail here. I hope it gains traction, although my
personal preference would be to find ways-if it is not too late-to
reduce our addiction to nontreaty international agreements."
6
My remarks have focused on issues of transparency in the domestic
arena, but it is important to keep in mind that these issues are also highly
salient (and at least as challenging) in the international arena. This is so
because the forces favoring transparency in that arena may have less
power than in any domestic context and the need for consensus may
skew organizational policy in the opposite direction.
Transparency is one of the overarching themes of our time. It
reflects the public's rising-no, risen-expectations as to how official
decisions will be made and explained. This is a hopeful sign for
democracy and an important byproduct of the open government laws
that were enacted in the last half of the twentieth century, the rise of
civil-society NGOs, and the broad availability of information through the
internet. Whatever the causes, transparency as such-as both law and
policy-merits both advocacy and continuing study, including courses
that focus on it specifically and in depth. Some law schools have already
74. Id.
75. 1 U.S.C. § ii2b (2oo6).
76. Hathaway, supra note 72, at 245 & n-316.
77. This trend is reminiscent of our increasing willingness to engage in international hostilities
without resort to the formal declaration of war contemplated by the Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art.
I, § 8, cl. ii ("The Congress shall have Power ... To declare War."). In both instances, I see Congress
as complicit in the erosion of its powers, although in the case of the treaty power, U.S. CONST. art. II.
§ 2, cl. 2, it is the Senate that is the institutional loser.
78. Recent studies include: David P. Forsythe. The ICRC: A Unique Humanitarian Protagonist,
89 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 63, 90 (2007); Alexandru Grigorescu, Transparency of Intergovernmental
Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental
Organizations, 51 INT'L STUD. Q. 625 (2007); and Friedl Weiss, Transparency as an Element of Good
Governance in the Practice of the EU and the WT: Overview and Comparison, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
'545 (2007). The United States has played a positive role in encouraging greater transparency within
the UN particularly. See UN Transparency and Accountability Initiative, http://usun.state.gov/about/
un reform/tran acc init/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17. 2009).
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moved in this direction," and I expect others to do so in the future. Our
democracy will be the stronger for it.
79. For example, Stephen I. Vladeck and Daniel J. Metcalfe teach a seminar on "The Law of
Secrecy" at American University, Washington College of Law. See Collaboration on Government
Secrecy, http://www.wcl.american.edullawandgov/cgs/about.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
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